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In the hook. Mystical Languages of Unsaying, Michael A. Sells presents a performative theory of
apophatic discourse. His idea is that apophatic discourse functions as a semantic analogue to mystical
experience through "meaning events." Although he acknowledges that an appreciation of the subtleties
of metaphor is crucial to an understanding of mystical language, Sells does not discuss the extensive
literature on metaphor theoiyfrom the lastfew decades. In this essay, the author explores how George
Lakoff' and Mark Johnson's theory of metaphor may enrich Sells' theory. Further, he addresses what
Lakoff and Johnson may learn from Sells' treatment. While there are no conflicts, strictly speaking,
between the metaphysical pictures suggested by the two theories. Sells' picture of the world allows for
fissures ofmeaning at which Lakoffand Johnson's theory at best hints. Ultimately, Lakoff'and Johnson's
conception of metaphor requires that Sells' theory of apophatic disc(mrse be reexamined.
Sells on apophatic discourse
In Mystical Languages of Unsaying,
Michael A. Sells presents a novel theory of
mystical language. Sells' view is that mysti-
cal language is used (by mystics)
performatively, in some sense of the word.'
The goal of the use of mystical language is,
then, to produce a type of semantic event.
Sells calls this a "meaning event." -^
Meaning event indicates that moment
when the meaning has become identical
or fused with the act of predication. In
metaphysical terms, essence is identical
with existence, but such identity is not
only asserted, it is performed.... The
meaning event is the semantic analogue
to the experience of mystical union. It
does not describe or refer to mystical
union but effects a semantic union that
re-creates or imitates the mystical union.
^
To understand sentences as discrete proposi-
tions, abstracted from mystical texts or prac-
tices, is to misunderstand importantly such
expressions. Rather than interpreting negat-
ing or apophatic utterances alone, one must
understand them against some affirmative, or
kataphatic, backdrop. In such a context,
apophatic expressions cause a semantic break.
This fissure, then, is the emergence of the
(real) meaning of the apophatic discourse. It
is this meaning to which the apophatic and
kataphatic expressions (working in concert)
were directing the cognizer. Sells speaks of
this as an anarchic use of language,^ and the
political metaphor is quite apt. After all, one
would not use the terni anarchy to describe a
chaotic social arrangement generally, but,
rather more appropriately, an established so-
cial order that has broken down in some man-
ner. It is against such a background that anar-
chy distinguishes itself (it also has another,
against which to be defined). Similarly, with
apophatic language, it is the backdrop of af-
firmative expressions that provides for nega-
tions having meaning (if not content, as such).
-This is what Sells means when he writes:
The meaning event occurs within a
kataphatic theological context. The
apophatic language itself contains a
strongly mimetic aspect, that is. through
particular stratagems (such as "with-
drawing" the subject from a subject-
predicate proposition), it aims to induce
within the reader an event that will
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emerge from the kataphalic context
(such as the notion of awakening), but
which in itself refuses subject-predicate
dichotomy (an awakening without
awakener). The moment of fusion of
subject and predicate is epiiemeral; the
awakening without awakener soon
reifies into just another object of
experience. The writer must continu-
ally turn back to unsay the previous
saying.-^
A methodological point needs to be clari-
fied before I can go further. I refer to Sells'
theory of mystical language, but that may be
misleading. Sells does not wish for his views
on mystical language to be understood as a
formula to be applied.^ «
Rather, he characterizes f
it as a "schematic and
formal outline." ^ It is
difficult to understand
what Sells means by this
distinction, but I inter-
pret it to mean that Sells
is generating a fallible
hypothesis about mysti-
cal language, a work-in-
progress. With a rough
idea of Sells' theory in mind, I move on to
an exploration of how it accounts for a vari-
ety of mystical texts.
The mystical texts Sells explores vary in
terms of their philosophical versus their de-
votional content. This is not to indicate that
any of these texts are purely one or the other.
Rather, some of the authors Sells discusses
seem to have had a scholarly audience in
mind, while others seem to have had a reli-
gious audience (insofar as these may be un-
derstood to be separate). I consider Plotinus
and John the Scot Eriugena to belong to the
former, while Marguerite Porete and Meister
Eckhart belong to the latter. This distinction
will be largely glossed over in what follows.
However, a tiuly comprehensive study would
need to observe this important distinction
among apophatic writers. In order to illus-
trate how Sells draws on both types of writ-
ers, I focus my analysis of his theory upon
his treatment of two of them: Eriugena and
Porete.
Eriugena's apophatic theology, found in
his Periphyseon, embodies much of Sells'
theory of apophatic discourse. For example,
a central thesis in Sells' theory is that expres-
sions of apophasis ought not be taken out of
context in a discourse. This is what he means
by Double Propositions.
No statement about X can rest as a valid
statement but must be corrected by a
further statement, which must itself be
corrected in a discourse without
closure.^
Eriugena writes the Periphyseon as a dialogue
between a "nutritor" (an established philoso-
The ^'positive nothingnesSy'* which is
Eriugena^s view of deity, is one that
enables reason itself to be pious. But as
is seen in the dialogue between the
nutritor and the alumnuSy this rational
piety is never achieved once andfor all.
pher) and an "alumnus" (a novice).'' In the
very structure of Eriugena's writing can be
seen this dialectical mode of creating mysti-
cal meaning.
Sells observes that Eriugena relies sig-
nificantly upon Pseudo-Dionysius' mystical
theology and states that Pseudo-Dionysius
privileges apophatic discourse.'" Can the
alumnus be thought of as the voice of
kataphatic theology? I believe it would be
too simplistic to do so, but there would be a
point to such a characterization. The nutritor
is well aware of both kataphatic and
apophatic moods in expressions about God.
However, the alumnus states such kataphatic
moods more emphatically (and exclusively).
Sells writes of the tension that emerges in
this dialogue:
A true drama is unfolding within the
technical language and academic
niceties. Not the least element in that
drama is the sense that at this point in
the dialogue the nutritor and alumnus
have become equals in the discussion,
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pushing it toward a conclusion it might
not have reached had the nutritor
merely propounded his own precon-
ceived ideas."
It is this drama which a theory of mystical lan-
guage seeks to take note of—what happens in
virtue of the articulation of Double Propositions.
This is where the term agnosia is useful
in studying apophatic language. Sells de-
scribes agnosia as "an unknowing that goes
beyond rather than falling short of kataphatic
affirmations." '-
This agnosia begins with the contem-
plation (tlii'dria)oi' the "place" of the
deity beyond all gaze or contempla-
tion."
Agnosia functions against the backdrop of
what is known. It is awareness of a "positive
nothing" rather than a "negative nothing,"
about which Peter Hawkins and Anne
Ht)wland Schotter write:
If the ineffable is that about which
nothing truly can be said, perhaps (to
borrow a line from Wallace Stevens's
"Snowman") we can differentiate
between "the nothing that is not there
and the nothing that is"-betwccn what
wc may call a "negative" ineffable and
a "positive" one.'^
It is this "positive nothing" (or ineffable) to
which apophatic discourse intends to draw
attention. This is the awareness of a fullness,
a transcendence—not a mere lack of presence.
Sells writes:
In Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa,
Eriugena found an alternative to the
substantialist view of dcily propounded
by the Church councils, which had
consistently applied the term ousia
(substance, being) to the nature(s) of
Christ and to the trinity, and which
through the writings of Augustine had
become central to the Western Christian
tradition. Within the Pcriphyseon,
Eriugena integrated into his own
apophatic discourse both Dionysius"
affimiation that the deity was "beyond-
being" and Gregory's suggestion that
the "nothing" (creatio e\ niliilo) was
the divine nothingness out of which all
being proceeds. '*
The "positive nothingness," which is
Eriugena's view of deity, is itself to be pious.
But as is seen in the dialogue between the
nutritor and the alumnus, this rational piety is
never achieved once and for all. Rather, this
sense of piety creates fissures in an otherwise
reified, kataphatic view of deity and faith. The
nutritor warns the alumnus that these fissures
can be reified themselves and become obstacles
to such piety. Indeed, the nutritor, seemingly
anticipating some of the insights in contempo-
rary metaphor theory, suggests to the alumnus
that even the apparently innocuous use of
prepositions can have unfortunate conse-
quences. Sells writes:
It would be easy to dismiss such a
concern with the minutiae of grammar
and with what might seem an unduly
literal reading of a preposition. For the
nutritor. however, such a summary
dismissal has serious consequences. The
delimitations of language become
invisible and consequently more
powerful and destructive. At issue is the
dependence of thought upon language.
To claim that such language should not
be taken spatially is to ignore the power
of language. The spatial element in a
preposition cannot be willed away as if it
were not fundamental to the word. As the
dialogue proceeds, the nutritor will insist
that to believe such spatial connotations
can be willed away is to become all the
more vulnerable to what he will call the
"monstrous and abominable idols"
hidden within such language."'
It is here that Lakoff and Johnson have the
most to offer Sells' theory. However, their
insights require some rethinking of Sells'
theory of mystical language.
Another important mystic discussed by
Sells is Marguerite Porete. All too often over-
looked or neglected and negated,'"' Porete's
mystical writings provide another field of
complex metaphors iuid apophatic expressions
with which a theory such as Sells' may deal.
That such a text could provoke such strong
reactions would make it worth study on its
own; however, insofar as it is an under-ex-
plored text in Western mysticism, it will pro-
vide a novel example for Sells' theory to ex-
plain.
Any act done as a means (moyens,
intermedium) or as a use (usage, usum)
is a "work," which entails an enslave-
ment to the will. What might seem an
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unexceptional doctrine of salvation
tlirough faith rather than works is then
pushed to the extreme: the soul that
gives up all will and works is no k)nger
concerned with poverty or riches, honor
or dishonor, heaven or hell, with self,
other, or deity. Such a state of utter
selflessness, or annihilation of the will
and reason—both of which are con-
cerned with works—cannot be achieved
through works or effon. It occurs when
the soul is taken up or ravished iravie,
ruphi, ravissee) by its divine lover."*
What impact do love and desire have upon
one's encounter with the loved or desired
other? This image of transforming love
brings to mind Martin Buber's distinction
between I-Thou versus I-It modes of expe-
riencing the world. In the former, the sub-
ject is constituted in virtue of the relation-
ship, whereas in the latter the subject is con-
Lakoffand Johnson^s theory ofmetaphor
begins with a simple idea whose scope of
application is quite large: metaphors make
up some of the most basic and pervasive
uses of language we have, including philo-
sophical and theological uses of language.
stituted prior to the experience of the ob-
ject (which is not considered here as an
"other," but merely as an "it"). This simi-
larity does not invite a rash accommoda-
tion of Porete's late medieval work to that
of a twentieth-century philosopher-theolo-
gian. Porete's work lies in a long tradition
of apophatic writers who were profoundly
struck by the encounter with transcendence.
This encounter effected a strong pious re-
sponse with respect to the Other. However,
while a thinker like Buber explored this
relational ity sotnewhat abstractly, Porete
explored the encounter with the transcen-
dent in erotic metaphors.
As does Eriugena's work, Porete's text.
The Mirror ofSimple Souls, takes the form
of a dialogue. Sells observes:
The Mirror ofSimple Souls is a book of
122 chapters, most of it a dialogue of
courtly love carried out among a group
of personified characters. The principal
participants are Lady Love (Dame Amour),
also called Her Highness Amour, and
the Enfranchised Soul H'cinie
enfraiicliie), also called the Annihilated
Soul, or simply, the Soul. |...| The
central event of the drama is the death
of Reason who, after continued
questioning of Dame Amour over the
paradoxes of love, finally dies (chap.
87), "mortally wounded by love." This
theatrically constructed event marks a
major transformation in the annihilated
soul, who is now freed from reason and
able to "reclaim her heritage." '''
Note the similarities present here between
Porete's dialogue and that of Eriugena in the
Periphyseon. Note the similarities between
the questioning roles of Reason and of the
i^ alumnus. Both func-
tion as foils against
which the apophatic
view is contrasted. In
bt)th cases, the use of a
dialogue emphasizes a
dramatic element to the
transcendent encounter.
Also in both cases, the
stakes of the dialogue
are quite high. The nu-
>-* tritor is aware of this
when the power dynamics between himself
and the alumnus have been equaled. The
stakes are much higher in Porete's dialogue
(as Reason loses its life). Moreover, after the
death of Reason, the soul is "free" to "reclaim
her heritage."
Sells cautions against misunderstanding
Porete's work as merely asserting the priority
of faith over works in attaining salvation in
the Christian mythos.
A work is any act carried out through
one's own will. [...] The harder the soul
attempts to transcend will, the more she
becomes entrapped in it; the more she
works to transcend works, the more she
is enslaved to works. From such a
dilemma, reason can find no way out.'"
This is where apophatic moves come in. By
saying that reason cannot find a way out of
this dilemma, what is being said is that fur-
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ther information, or deductions performed on
infomiation already attained, will not solve
the problem. This is why reason must "die."
This is not to say that reason has no helpful
role to play. Following Sells' suggestions, it
is against the context of rationality (preposi-
tional truth and rational inquiry) that apophatic
moves attain their dramatic perfonnance. The
tendency to view assertions exclusively indi-
vidually, as discrete propositions, is the prob-
lem. Instead, it is through silencing reason (not
once and for all, but as an admonishing) that
the will shall be transcended. Sells writes,
Dame Amour conceives of grace as
divine love, which is nothing other than
deity itself. This love allows the soul to
become "disencumbered" of its will and
works, and thereby, of its own self.
Only when the soul's own being and
will arc annihilated can the deity work
through and in it.-'
There is a paradox here. The implication is
that the soul's being and will are obstacles in
the way of the deity's working in and through
the soul. But, as Sells goes on to point out,
only the deity itself can remove these ob-
stacles. The soul cannot will to annihilate its
own being and will. Such can only happen
by the grace of divine love. Moreover, Sells
writes that Porete's view is "an understand-
ing of the annihilated soul [that] cannot be
found in scripture, that human sense (sensiis)
cannot apprehend it, nor human work merit
it. It is a gift...."" Given the context of the
relationship between the annihilated soul and
the deity as an erotic relationship, it seems
appropriate to note that an important precon-
dition for such a relationship is trust. What
seems implied in this analogy is a manner of
living where the pious adherent seeks after
no longer seeking. Most importantly, this apo-
ria of the will is embraced through Porete's
dissolution of the self as a discrete entity. In
mystical union, the self is lost in the deity.
The distinction between subject and object is
now unsaid.
This "apophasis of desire" (in Sells' lan-
guage) leads to a sense of abandon with re-
spect to engaging in life.
The soul's abandonment of discretion
reflects a paradox found within courtly
love. The rules of courtly love or
"courtesy" (cortezia) demand discre-
tion, conforming to the conventions and
norms of society, and mcziira, avoiding
of excesses of feeling and behavior. Yet
the courtly lover {fin amaii) continually
violated these standards of cortezia and
mcziira and acted in a solitary,
excessive manner. Porcte has combined
this language of cortezia with an
apophatic language of mystical union.
The union-with-and-in-lovc is rapture.
Rapture is the act and work of love. The
language of rapture includes a complex
of interdependent terms and figures of
speech (disrobing, nakedness, loss of
discretion, loss of shame, abandon) that
reinforce the basic sexual metaphor. As
Dame Amour said, there is no "discre-
tion" in love. The soul gives up her
honor, her shame. She disrobes herself
of will. Her union with the divine lover
occurs in nakedness. She gives herself
over to abandon. She "falls" (in an
expression that will have many levels of
meaning) into love.''
Again, note the similarities between "aban-
don" and "rapture" in Porete's idiom and an-
archy in Eriugena. In both cases, there is a
rupture or break from "rational" or factual,
propositional uses of language. In fact, espe-
cially in the metaphor of a sexual relation-
ship between the soul and the divine lover,
one sees how anemic reason (propositional
discourse) really is. The trust and rapture of
the lover for its other are basic; the use of rea-
son would be as a helper to such a relation-
ship. I am reminded here of Nietzsche's fa-
mous opening to Beyond Good and Evil (in
that case, the cold reason of the philosopher
is compared to the need for passionate pur-
suit of truth).
Porete's apophatic treatment of desire re-
lies upon a kataphatic tradition of faith and
works. Again, mystical insights become pos-
sibilities when instantiated within the context
of a structure of symbols. The rapture of
mystical union (if such may be spoken of as a
discrete referent) is possible only through the
process of negation or abstraction from the
reifying force of language. Here is where fur-
ther exploration of these themes will benefit
from a discussion of Lakoff and Johnson's
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contemporary theory of metaphor. Their con-
ception of embodied reason will shed light
upon why using these metaphors can be so
useful at providing dramatic experiences of
the divine. However, as I note in my conclu-
sion, Lakoff and Johnson's findings require a
rethinking of some of Sells' ideas about
apophatic discourse.
Lakoff and Johnson's theory of
metaphor
George Lakoftand Mark Joluison's theory
of metaphor begins with a simple idea whose
scope of application is quite large. The idea
is this: metaphors are not parts of speech
whose function is the exception to the rule of
literal uses of language. Rather, metaphors
make up some of the most basic and perva-
sive uses of language we have, including (and
in the context of this essay, especially) philo-
sophical and theological uses of language.
Metaphor is for most people a device of
the poetic imagination and the rhetori-
cal flourish—a matter of extraordinary
rather than ordinary language. More-
over, metaphor is typically viewed as
characteristic of language alone, a
matter of words rather than thought or
action. For this reason, most people
think they can get along perfectly well
without metaphor. We have found, on
the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive
in everyday life, not just in language
but in thought and action. Our ordinary
conceptual system, in terms of which
we both think and act, is fundamentally
metaphorical in nature.-^
Interestingly, many of the ideas found in their
work is reminiscent of the insights of several
of the mystics Sells studies. Both these mys-
tics and Lakoff and Johnson are aware of the
non-triviality of metaphor in everyday lan-
guage. Both develop sophisticated systems
for appreciating how metaphors reveal
worldviews. Lakoff and Johnson's system
turns on the idea of metaphorical mapping.
Since their seminal work two decades ago.
Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson's
metaphorical theory has undergone some de-
velopment. Advances in the cognitive sciences
have warranted some adjustments in the theory.
These adjustments generally have to do with
developments regarding how best to think
about so-called mental content (i.e., as being
basically propositional in content or as being
activation patterns across neural networks). I
refer to the conceptual version of the theory
as the "old" theory, and the neural network
version of the theory as the "new" one. For
their part, Lakoff and Johnson seem willing
to embrace the advances in neural science via
their new theory. However, the basic insight
of the theory remains the same: cross-domain
conceptual mappings are pervasive in human
thought. But just what is a cross-domain con-
ceptual mapping? Lakoff and Johnson write:
Primary metaphors, from a neural
perspective, are neural connections
learned by coactivialion. They extend
across parts of the brain between areas
dedicated to sensorimotor experience
and areas dedicated to subjective
experience. The greater inferential
complexity of the sensory and motor
domains gives the metaphors an
asymmetric character, with inferences
flowing in one direction only.
From a conceptual point of view,
primary metaphors are cross-domain
mappings, from a source domain (the
sensorimotor domain) to a target
domain (the domain of subjective
experience), preserving inference and
sometimes preserving lexical represen-
tation. Indeed, the preservation of
inference is the most salient property of
conceptual metaphors. '^
The parallels between the old and new theo-
ries can be seen here. At this juncture in the
cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of
mind, it is probably best to develop parallel
expressions of a theory (along the lines seen
in Lakoff and Johnson's theory) that involve
rationality. The entailments of one expression
may not precisely match up with the other
—
and in many cases this will be very useful.
The old expression of the theory allows for
greater integration into other conceptual theo-
ries. Likewise, the new expression of the
theory allows for greater connections with the
neural sciences. I will use the old, concep-
tual, expression of the theory, given that the
integration taking place in this paper is be-
tween metaphor theory and an appraisal of a
theory of mystical language.
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The basic idea in Lakoff and Johnson's
theory of metaphor is that concepts from the
sensorimotor domain of experience are often
used to understand conceptual domains in-
volving subjective experience. But what do
Lakoff and Johnson mean by "subjective"
here? It may be helpful to think of such do-
mains as more or less removed from the
senorimotor domain of experience. That is,
target domains are conceptual domains which
are comparatively abstract. The idea is that
one may use the structure of sensorimotor
conceptual domains to understand something
of the structure of more abstract concepts. An
example of such a mapping is their much-used
Porete^s work lies in a long tradition of
apophatic writers who were profoundly
struck by the encounter with transcen-
dence. This encounter effected a strong
pious response with respect to the Other,
"Life Is A Journey" metaphorical mapping.^''
Recognizing the contingency of this mapping,
they now refer to it as "A Purposeful Life Is A
Journey" metaphor. Not everyone thinks of
life as a journey. However, making this as-
pect of the metaphor explicit was not truly
necessary. The central point of Lakoff and
Johnson's theory is to reveal just how perva-
sive (and optional, even when pervasive)
cross-domain conceptual mappings really are.
Some of the constituent metaphors that play
a role in the "A Purposeful Life Is A Journey"
metaphor are as follows:
"A Person Living A Life Is A Traveler"
"Life Goals Are Destinations"
"A Life Plan Is An Itinerary" -^
These constituent metaphors work together in
concert, providing an array of concepts with
which to conceptualize what a purposeful life
is. This particular cross-domain mapping has
become quite pervasive in American culture.
It is somewhat surprising to learn that it is an
optional mode of understanding life. How-
ever, cross-domain conceptual mappings are
important for an additional reason, as Lakoff
and Johnson write:
Perhaps the most important thing to
understand about conceptual metaphors is
that they are used to reason with. The Love
Is A Journey mapping does not just permit
the use of travel words to speak of love.
That mapping allows fomis of reasoning
about travel to be used in reasoning about
love. It functions so as to map inferences
about travel into inferences about love,
enriching the concept of love and
extending it to love-as-journey.-'
What this suggests is that a person does not
merely conceptualize subjective conceptual
dotiiains by means of sensorimotor domains;
rather, what a person learns about such sub-
jective domains may depend
critically upon what source
conceptual domain was used
in order to structure the tar-
get domain. Given that these
mappings are contingent,
what a person learns will be
structured contingently as
well. Lakoff has stated that
* this theory may be thought
of primarily as one of cross-domain concep-
tual mappings, and secondarily as a theory of
metaphor (insofar as metaphors are
instantiations of the mappings).-" However,
since the mappings consist in understanding
one class of terms by means of another class
of temis, referring to it as a theory of meta-
phor is not entirely misleading.
This brings me to a part of Lakoff and
Johnson's theory with which I have some
problems: their theory of truth. Because of
the culturally and bodily dependent nature of
cross-domain mappings, Lakoff and Johnson
argue that truth ought to be characterized in
this way:
A person takes a statement as "true" of
a situation if what he or she understands
the sentence as expressing accords with
what he or she understands the situation
to be.'"
This is supplied as an alternative to correspon-
dence theories of truth, but what do Lakoff
and Johnson mean by the word "accords"? I
am unsure of how this word is any better than
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(other than being different from) the word
"corresponds." Moreover, Lal<^off and
Johnson refer to what a sentence expresses.
It is this that accords with what is understood
about a situation when a sentence is taken to
be true of that situation. Perhaps "is consis-
tent" would be a suitable substitute expres-
sion for "accords." However, if so, then
Lakoff and Johnson would be left with a
nonrealist account of truth (i.e., truth depends
solely upon one's background beliefs). Also,
it is often the case that what is most impor-
tant in an inquiry is what one does not know
or understand about a situation or state of af-
fairs. This observation needs to be addressed.
Surely, an adequate theory of representation
(of which a theory of tiiith will be a part) needs
to account both for the reality of a cognizer-
independent world as well as the manner in
which our concepts (especially cross-domain
mappings) grasp and frame the world we en-
counter. However, this is not that theory. It
satisfies the second requirement while ne-
glecting the first. Lakoff and Johnson assert
that they wish to have an embodied realist pic-
The insight ofapophatic discourse, as
well as of contemporary metaphor theory
y
is that how a person understands these
abstract conceptual domains is optional.
To view any conceptual mapping as nec-
essary or essential is at best an exaggera-
tion, and at worst an important mistake.
ture of the world: one steeped in the cogni-
tive and natural sciences. This shows the
reader something of a promissory note—that
for which Lakoff and Johnson need to pro-
vide a theory of truth to explain. So long as
their theory of truth does not appreciate this
aspect of the meaning of truth—namely, that
the world outruns our conceptualizations of
it—it will be inadequate. Putting aside these
qualms about their theory of truth, there is
much I can accept about Lakoff and Johnson's
theory of metaphor. In particular, I am in-
clined to adopt their theory of cross-domain
mappings as quite illuminating of the nature
of reason.
While Lakoff and Johnson seem to think
that their theory of metaphor (and of reason
in general) will upset the dominant Western
paradigms—perhaps an over-expectation
—
their theory does provide a picture of em-
bodied reason which is worth attention. What
their theory reveals is that many philosophi-
cal and logical analyses of abstract concepts
(such as time, causation, and meaning in life)
have incoiporated cross-domain metaphori-
cal mappings. Thus, the chapter title, "The
Cognitive Science of Philosophy," is rather
provocative. If the point of philosophical in-
quiry is to gain perspective on a given sub-
ject matter, to understand the subject from
the greatest point of generality, then an ap-
preciation of metaphor theory will be cru-
cial. However, such inquiry should not be
undertaken too naively. Cognitive science
is not a ready-made conceptual domain; it,
^^ too, has its rifts and ar-
J eas of disagreement. An
appreciative, but critical,
stance toward the cogni-
tive sciences is war-
ranted. With that in mind,
it is best to think of
Lakoff and Johnson's
theory as a good and
powerful explanation of
cross-domain mappings.
However, the very disci-
plines of philosophy that
they would dismantle
have helped define and create the tools they
they would use for the dismantling. Insofar
as their approach instills a certain humility
in the philosopher with respect to the ques-
tion of getting to the "essence" of a subject
matter, their view is helpful. However, form-
ing opinions about the nature of these sub-
jects may be likewise unavoidable. It may
be that that which they critique is, in one im-
portant sense, not optional.
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Enriching Sells' theory of
apophatic discourse with Lakoff
and Johnson's metaphor theory
What does l.akoff and Johnse)n's theory
have to offer Sells' theory of mystical lan-
guage? As mentioned above, Sells takes note
of the novel metaphors and unique uses of
prepositions found in mystical texts. What
pictures are presupposed by such cross-do-
main mappings? Sells explores Eriugena's
treatment of creatio e.\ niliilo. There are com-
mon readings of this idea:
The temporal meaning implies that the
creator exists prior to this creation, and
that "noihing" was there prior to its
becoming the creation into which it was
made. |...| The spatial meaning and
the material meaning are closely related.
The word "from" relates a creator or
maker to something outside of itself, to
some kind of material or place out of
which he fashions his creation.^'
Eriugena appropriates Pseudo-Dionysius'
view of emanation as overflow. Sells writes
of this:
Thus the logos Hows into all things (the
spatial metaphor is exposed), it flows
them into being (the metaphor of
diffusion), and it overflows them, i.e., it
transcends the things it has flowed into
being, or it transcends the self it has
flowed into being.
One final step is needed before
Eriugena can complete his exploration
of the metaphor of overflowing. This
final step was foreshadowed by the
alumnus's questions cited above: "But
when I hear or say that the divine good
created all from nothing, I do not
understand what is signifled by that
name, 'nothing,' whether the privation
of all essence or substance or accident,
or the excellence of the divine beyond-
esscnce." All understandings of noihing
as privation—be they based upon
temporal, spatial, or material para-
digms—have been discredited. The
alternative, hinted at by the alumnus in
his mention of the "beyond-being," is
the nonsubstantialist view of deity.^^
The appropriation of novel cross-domain map-
pings reveals that conventional (kataphatic)
readings of the divine are optional and over-
emphasize certain characteristics (e.g. the tem-
poral priority of the deity in creatio e.\ iiihilo).
In the metaphor of overflow, Pseudo-
Dionysius and Eriugena use the source domain
of how liquids flow to structure the highly
abstract concept of divine emanation (as that
concept is understood in Neoplatonic philoso-
phy). The insight of apophatic discourse, as
well as of contemporary metaphor theory, is
that how a person understands these abstract
conceptual domains is optional. To view any
conceptual mapping as necessary or essential
is at best an exaggeration, and at worst an im-
portant mistake.
As for Sells' treatment of the mystical
writings of Porete, Lakoff and Johnson's
theory would provide helpful tools. Porete 's
guiding metaphor of mystical-union-as-erotic-
relationship matches up well with Lakoff and
Johnson's theory of cross-domain mapping.
In this case, the relatively basic conceptual
domain of erotic relationships is used to struc-
ture the relatively abstract conceptual domain
of mystical union. Moreover, this metaphori-
cal engagement with the divine reveals the
contingency of and the problems with tradi-
tional reified conceptions of will, desire, self,
subject and object, and God. The familiar
mysteriousness of the lover is mapped onto
the distant mysteriousness of the deity.
Conclusion
Where Lakoff and Johnson's theory of
cross-domain conceptual mapping goes fur-
ther than Sells' theory of mystical language
is in terms of the continual reemergence of
everyday factual discourse. For Lakoff and
Johnson, reason is built up out of many cross-
domain mappings of concepts or neural acti-
vation patterns. Sells writes of how paradoxi-
cal expressions or metaphors may destabilize
a discourse (opening it up for an apophatic
meaning event ).^^
However, the word "destabilize" suggests
a cross-domain mapping itself—one in which
the relatively basic conceptual domain of sta-
bility (perhaps of architecture) is mapped onto
the relatively abstract domain of discourse.
Sells' theory depends crucially on not reifying
the object of mystical contemplation. He does
not wish to reinterpret apophatic language as
anything other than being apophatic. How-
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ever, insofar as metaphors project a structure
upon the target domain, the other will be
reified in mystical discourses that use meta-
phorical mapping. Take, for example, the
Dionysian expression that divinity is beyond
being. This suggests a way of thinking about
divinity that implies both a spatial orientation
(upon which all referents are fixed, as if on a
grid) and a sense of relative distance. While
such a manner of thinking of divinity may
function apophatically to the extent that it re-
veals reified aspects of kataphatic descriptions
of divinity, this Dionysian expression also
projects its own kataphatic meaning (namely,
a certain spatial orientation). This is clearly
revealed in Lakoff and Johnson's metaphor
theory. Awareness of this kataphatic "residue"
or remainder in apophatic discourse is con-
sistent with Sells' theory (insofar as Sells un-
derstands his theory to have schematic or pro-
visional status). By and large, I agree with
Sells' findings. Despite a less than perfectly
rigorous apophatic sensibility, his character-
ization of mystical language is illuminating.
However, Lakoff and Johnson's theory of
metaphor reveals that even Sells' character-
izations are contingent and optional (despite
their utility).
That said, there is nothing in Lakoff and
Johnson's theory of cross-domain conceptual
mapping that so much as hints at the seman-
tic fissures in kataphatic discourse that
apophasis creates. Certainly, Lakoff and
Johnson are aware of the rich diversity of
metaphorical mappings available across cul-
tures. However, this dynamic of mystical lan-
guage is overlooked in their theory. More-
over, I believe that a greater appreciation for
religious symbolism and metaphor would give
Lakoff and Johnson a better appreciation of
what is at stake in differences among cultures,
with respect to their paradigmatic conceptual
mappings. While these are not problems for
Lakoff and Johnson's account, I believe it is
an oversight that these instances of concep-
tual mapping have been neglected.
In this essay, I have explored some impli-
cations an appreciation of Lakoff and
Johnson's metaphor theory might have for
Sells' theory of apophatic discourse. I believe
that, for the most part. Sells would receive
the greater benefit from putting the two theo-
ries into dialogue. Out of my own intellec-
tual concerns, I would like to see Lakoff and
Johnson explore the use of metaphor in mys-
tical discourses. Dialogue with theories of
mystical language might not advance Lakoff
and Johnson's cognitive work on metaphor,
however an awareness of cross-domain con-
ceptual mappings in mystical discourses
would provide an interesting application for
the theory. Moreover, insofar as the new
theory of cross-domain mappings is framed
in terms of neural activation patterns, one can
imagine entailments of Lakoff 's theory hav-
ing to do with cognitive analyses of mystical
experiences. If Sells' theory is right, and if
mystical "meaning events" "*' can be identi-
fied, and if these can be represented in terms
of activation patterns across neural networks,
then mystical events may be studied with the
resources of the cognitive sciences. I find this
a truly exciting possibility.
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